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 Abstract 
This article critically examines the concept of legal empowerment as it has been used with reference to transitional justice, 
mapping its rise and impact based on a selection of case studies. In recent decades, international transitional justice advocacy 
has evolved dramatically, with practice increasingly emphasising the centrality of criminal accountability for violence, precisely 
as more holistic approaches have emerged that have broadened the remit of transitional justice. Post-conflict justice advocates 
have thus become professionalized transitional justice entrepreneurs working on issues such as democratic transitions, rule of 
law, and human rights. A legal empowerment discourse has emerged in a number of scholarly debates that discuss legalistic and 
normative issues related to the implementation of retributive and restorative justice mechanisms. In theory, the concept of legal 
empowerment addresses the issue of social exclusion in transitions, increasing the rights of the marginalized. In practice, 
however, legal empowerment has disappointed and raises several issues around its performance that are scrutinized in this 
article. Drawing on case studies in Nepal, Tunisia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina the authors analyse issues related to agency, 
institutions and structure, and argue for a needs-centred, participatory approach in place of the rights-based legal empowerment 
concept. 
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Introduction 
 
In autumn 2013, George Soros, the founder of the Open Society Foundations, wrote that legal empowerment is “the process of 
increasing the capacity of ordinary people to exercise their human and civil rights as individuals or as members of a 
community.”1 His statement is a recent example of how the concept of legal empowerment has permeated through the 
organizational structures of international organizations, donors and foundations to advocate grassroots-centred development 
strategies not only as a response to poverty areas, but also in post-conflict zones. This article critically discusses legal 
empowerment practices as they might impact the field of transitional justice, where they have more recently emerged alongside 
retributive and restorative strategies.2 This analysis traces the rise of the legal empowerment discourse, and drawing on a 
number of case studies, examines the consequences of applying this concept in the field of  transitional justice. 
 
International transitional justice advocacy has evolved dramatically over time. While mechanisms to address the legacies of 
mass violence have broadened to include more holistic strategies in recent years, practices have nonetheless focused 
increasingly on criminal accountability for violations, often resulting in technocratic and legalistic approaches. As a result, 
transitional justice practitioners have become more professionalized and are involved in work encompassing democratic 
transitions, rule of law and human rights. A legal empowerment-oriented discourse, which emerged in the development field, has 
also surfaced in several scholarly debates on normative and legalistic issues associated with retributive and restorative justice 
practices. 
 
The legal empowerment concept, as claimed by its advocates, addresses development issues in transitions, expanding the rights 
of the marginalized. A 2008 report of the Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) defines the concept as ”a 
process of systemic change through which the poor and excluded become able to use the law, the legal system, and legal 
services to protect and advance their rights and interests as citizens and economic actors.”3 It is based on four pillars, including 
the rule of law and access to justice, property rights, labour rights, and business rights.4 The report furthermore recommends that 
post-conflict zones and countries in transition not only need regulations, but also effective institutions to enforce them and that 
their subjects (in particular the poor and marginalized) be in possession of a legal identity.5 Legal empowerment is considered a 
reform process built on parallel and coordinated interventions. “The whole process is to be understood as iterative and the 
relationship between the legal empowerment process and systemic change is mutually reinforcing,” the report mentions.6 
Ironically, many of the requirements listed in the report to implement legal empowerment effectively in transition settings – 
including justice sector reform, appropriate procedural rights, legal education and knowledge about the courts, among others7 – 
are often precisely those likely to be lacking or require improvement after conflict or political violence, particularly in the fragile 
states that typify transitional contexts. 
 
While the legal empowerment concept might appear promising in theory, in practice it raises several questions, especially in 
transitional justice contexts. First, it is questionable as to how well legal empowerment strategies can bolster transitions from 
conflict or authoritarian rule. As a case in point, some authors point out that in order to foster rights-based development, new 
redistribution measures have to be implemented, which go beyond legal reforms and require deep structural change.8 The 
selection of case studies in this article will provide additional empirical evidence that questions the usefulness of linking legal 
empowerment and transitional justice practices.  Second, what role do states, donors, civil society and other actors play in the 
adoption of specific legal empowerment programmes during transitions? And finally, can legal empowerment initiatives advance 
the rights and interests of underprivileged or marginalized groups that are often times overlooked by transitional justice 
mechanisms? The article explores these questions through in-depth case studies of Nepal, Tunisia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Based on these examples, the authors discuss a number of problems that remain unresolved despite legal empowerment 
initiatives. A better understanding of these issues is crucial to cope with current implementation difficulties faced by 
international organisations, donors and advocacy groups, in order to pave the road for more effective post-conflict justice efforts 
in the future. The issues include, for instance, the lack of agency of marginalized population in socio-political decision-making 
processes, weak state institutions, as well as challenging social, economic and political conditions on the ground. The objective 
of this study is to explore these problems within different geographic and socio-political settings, evaluating the role of legal 
empowerment. The authors argue that a rights-based approach is unsuited to such contexts and recommend that future 
initiatives centre more on need-oriented support and participatory approaches for local populations that seek a broader 
empowerment including the social, economic and political, rather than exclusively legal. To this end, the article first reviews 
some of the legal empowerment literature relevant to transitional justice scholarship, outlining various conceptual shortcomings 
for effectively implementing legal empowerment strategies in post-conflict and transitional justice contexts. The subsequent 
section briefly presents the methodology and research design used for this study. Then the authors elaborate on the Nepal, 
Tunisia and Bosnia case studies to illustrate their argument. 
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Literature review: legal empowerment, transitional justice, and rights versus needs 
 
Although legal empowerment has become a buzzword in the field of international development since the creation of CLEP, the 
idea of empowerment in development is not new and its impact on transitional justice processes should not be overlooked. In 
2001, for instance, Stephen Golub – at the time the project leader of a legal empowerment study conducted by the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) – co-authored a report laying out the foundations of the concept.9 The authors sought to capture its 
meaning broadly and defined it as both a process and a goal.10 While legal empowerment overlaps with other concepts, such as 
the rule of law and judicial reform, the report underlines that legal empowerment’s focus is not on judicial institutions or its 
actors, but on disadvantaged populations.11 This shift by policymakers from institutional requirements to marginalized actors 
occurred incrementally during the globalization of rule of law practices. In recent decades, international development practices 
have resulted in a rhetoric of integration of underprivileged groups into emerging legal systems in different parts of the world.12 
Earlier development literature had pointed to the need for local agency and ownership in the field, but emphasised the socio-
political, such as gender and communication.13 It was only over the course of time that discussions centred on law as a tool to 
enhance the power of local actors went beyond the boundaries of development scholarship. 
 
The liberal and law-oriented discourse spread and eventually reached the field of transitional justice. Yet, this approach, as some 
observed, had its limits.  As Dustin Sharp explains, this concept  
 
has often resulted in a relatively narrow approach to questions of justice in transition that foregrounds physical violence, including violations of 
physical integrity and civil and political rights more generally, while pushing questions of economic violence and economic justice to the margins.14 
 
Sharp’s observation fuels a couple of critical remarks about legal empowerment. First, CLEP’s definition of the legal 
empowerment concept appears to address broader socioeconomic issues that mainstream transitional justice processes do not 
focus on. There has been a trend in retributive transitional justice practices that law in post-conflict justice contexts is considered 
– among other things – a tool to make transitions efficient and measurable.15 Unfortunately, the legal empowerment discourse is 
in line with these data-driven practices in the legal field. Determining objectives and benchmarks that can be evaluated using 
quantitative data is one of the main goals pursued by advocates of the legal empowerment paradigm. In the past few years, 
reports issued by different international organizations have aimed at assessing the value of the concept. For example, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has developed a legal empowerment knowledge bank, which contains various country 
reports and case studies, some of which concentrate on how to best assess and measure the successful implementation of the 
empowerment strategy.16 Open source knowledge banks are increasingly popular and unsurprisingly, other international 
institutions, such as the World Bank, have also pushed to create platforms for knowledge dissemination.17 Although the number 
of reports added to the online library is continuously growing, the value of these types of assessments remains questionable 
because of inadequate evaluation strategies.18 
 
Second, such an approach illustrates the top-down nature of the activities put in place by bureaucratic international institutions, 
which often fail to include local perspectives in their policy strategies. Anna Di Lellio and Caitlin McCurn, for instance, capture 
the crux of the local involvement issue for transitional justice practices in Kosovo. 
      
The institutional discourse on transitional justice insists that local knowledge and context-specific approaches lie at its heart. For Kofi Annan’s report 
to the Security Council on transitional justice, the local, identified as the nation-state, is as important as international norms and standards. ... Yet, 
despite honest efforts to include locally owned initiatives, there is a fundamental aspect of the process on which local input is actively discouraged: 
the professional “toolkit” and its subordination to the goal of stability. This is evident in the focus that donors place on training, whether through 
workshops, conferences, or study tours, where local actors must listen more than be heard. 19 
 
It should be noted that ‘local’ here indicates the state, as it very often does in transitional justice discourse, ignoring the diversity 
of experience of transition and the very broad range of community needs of transitional justice within the nation state.  Even 
where it is acknowledged that the local may include non-state and non-institutional actors, insufficient attention is often paid to 
the many different locals that exist, and the power relations that bind them. Similar critiques have been voiced from a number of 
advocates of the legal empowerment concept. Di Lellio and McCurn’s study on the agency problem of local populations falls 
within a broader development and rule-of-law debate about knowledge transfer in developing countries, that some have 
criticized as a top-down approach implemented by international organizations.20 A closer inspection reveals that at the heart of 
this issue lies the question of legitimacy.21 In order to re-establish the trust between international actors and local actors to 
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implement the rule of law on the ground, non-profit organizations have to not only be more actively involved but also create a 
better global network for improved communication and strategy implementation. James Goldston, the executive director of the 
Open Society Justice Initiative, suggests, “creating an international civil society consortium of leading rule of law actors to carry 
out collaborative projects in countries both South and North.”22 Yet, the gap between theory and practice runs deep. Almost a 
decade after conceptualizing the idea of legal empowerment, Stephen Golub – criticizing the 2008 CLEP report – deplores that 
although the concept itself remains a success, a clear implementation strategy is lacking. He regrets that the report “does not 
detail how such reforms will address the perverse power dynamics that permeate such institutions to begin with.” 23 The report 
advocates a top-down approach that aims at convincing national leaders to implement legal empowerment programs for the 
poor, instead of helping the underprivileged and marginalized to create their own agenda. 24  
 
A lack of awareness of developments on the ground is one of the reasons for this disconnect. While the World Bank, one of the 
key organizations promoting the concept, is extending its reach and influence promoting legal empowerment in the developing 
world, it has a poor track record of evaluating these projects.25 An assessment study of World Bank practices of legal 
empowerment and access to justice finds that “ very little World Bank work explores legal approaches to holding public agencies 
and services accountable to citizens.”26 The critique of legal empowerment advocates does not stop at issues of implementation 
strategy, but goes beyond it. As a case in point, legal empowerment cannot be implemented in a vacuum: it requires political and 
economic institutions and has to integrate a broad range of issues.27 Some authors, like Dan Banik, further disapprove of CLEP’s 
limited focus, excluding as it does issues such as violence against women or education.28 As a result, this article builds on the 
above criticism by legal empowerment advocates and further expands the debate to the field of transitional justice. Elaborating 
on the link between legal empowerment and transitional justice is crucial because of a variety of fields and concepts –  including 
the rule of law, development and post-conflict justice, to name only a few – which grapple with a number of common issues. 
Below the authors outline several problems for transitional justice studies and the legal empowerment concept that should be 
addressed to improve the conditions for the disempowered on the ground. 
 
The main issues centre on power, space and actors. In their discussion about rights-based approaches in development, Andrea 
Cornwall and Celestine Nyamu-Musembi, for instance, explain that questions related to rights of underprivileged populations are 
intrinsically linked to the politics of power.29 Power remains in the hands of elites, as the empowerment discourse of 
international development actors only translates into a power transfer to national governments and elites. Such an approach 
puts the entire concept into question, as international development strategies are merely polished with a new rhetoric instead of 
being fundamentally re-conceptualised to address the needs of the marginal.30 Yet, the creation of a space for the marginalized 
to form their voice and develop agency in order to participate in the process is essential for sustainable development and peace. 
For David Crocker voice can be achieved via deliberation:  
 
In a society aspiring to be (more) liberal and democratic, public deliberation expresses the commitment to respect one’s fellow citizens and to enter 
into give and take with them so as to arrive at a democratic decision that all can live with, even though all do not agree with it. 31  
 
Moreover, Patricia Lundy and Mark McGovern, for instance, use the case study of Northern Ireland to describe how a locally-
oriented and community-led strategy to addressing legacies of conflict was implemented, avoiding elite-driven and donor-
centred policy implementation.32 While this case illustrates a transitional justice-oriented participatory approach, local legal 
empowerment initiatives in post-conflict contexts fuel only limited success stories. One of the main reasons for the questionable 
outcomes is CLEP’s top-down approach, which is associated with a number of problems, including imbalanced power relations, 
issues of identity, and a lack of voice for the marginalized.33 With years of experience in diverse post-conflict justice settings, the 
authors have observed fundamental shortcomings in transposing legal empowerment practices into local contexts. These 
shortcomings encompass a number of issues including the lack of local agency, unstable political institutions, and as socio-
economic cleavages that run deep in these societies as a result of years of conflict and political oppression. As a case in point, 
legal empowerment initiatives generally target contexts that are characterized by weak state institutions and a lack democratic 
leadership.34 Typical developmental issues, such as resource constraints, also add to the overall institutional and structural 
problems.35 Unsurprisingly, these issues also raise several questions with regards to legitimacy and accountability. In past work, 
the authors demonstrated that due to the technocratic approach of legal empowerment, organizations advocating for these 
practices emphasize a rights-based discourse, which often overlooks the basic needs of the populations in question.36 
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Additionally, they showed that the institutions responsible for implementing reforms and introducing change in post-conflict 
areas often lack the trust of the people and struggle to establish their legitimacy.37 Accountability falls within the same problem 
area. The legal mechanisms put in place to account for mass violence are often subject to question for various reasons, including 
the problem of using socio-political capital in political participation processes.38 In order to illustrate the limitations of legal 
empowerment for post-conflict and transitional justice contexts, the authors elaborate on these different issues by drawing from 
their fieldwork in Nepal, Tunisia, and Bosnia. 
 
 
Methods and design 
  
This article uses qualitative research methods, to gain a detailed picture of a variety of both transitional justice processes and the 
societies in which they unfold, while also outlining and interpreting the politics that circumscribe them. To this end, it draws on 
three different case studies, Nepal, Tunisia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Semi-structured interviews were the principle research 
method used in all contexts. The Nepal study is grounded in an ethnography of a socially excluded indigenous community in the 
district of Bardiya in the mid-western plains of the country.  In Tunisia, the authors additionally employed document analysis, and 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, participant observation.  Case studies were chosen for geographic breadth and to represent a range of 
different types of transition.39 While all case studies are characterized by post-conflict transition and address themes that are the 
focus of transitional justice initiatives by international organizations, the type of conflict, form of regime, current socio-political 
conditions and historical context vary greatly. The case study selection was made to enable analysis of different aspects of 
transitional justice processes, notably seeking to encompass the issues of marginalized and socially excluded populations in 
socio-political decision-making, the organizational framework of institutions on the ground and socio-political as well as socio-
economic conditions in each of the cases. These various factors are then examined to evaluate the role of legal empowerment 
initiatives in each context. 
 
 
Nepal: social exclusion, structural violence and the need for empowerment 
 
Nepal is typical of many fragile states in political transition trying to overcome long histories of poor governance, poverty and 
violent conflict. Nepal’s history of social exclusion, and the conflict to which it led, can provide valuable lessons concerning 
processes to address poverty and marginalisation as an integral component of ensuring long-term peace. Nepal’s conflict was 
the product of a society built upon the codified exclusion of a majority of its people on the basis of caste, ethnicity, and gender.40 
A rigid system of social stratification ensured that indigenous people faced life expectancy, literacy rates, and income far below 
the nation’s meagre average. The conflict was triggered by the declaration of a ‘People’s War’ against the state by a small Maoist 
group in 1996, whose mobilization of the excluded was such that ten years later it had effective control of most of the territory. 
Following a ceasefire in 2006 and a tortuously slow political process, the Maoists are now a constitutional political party, their 
troops have been demobilised, and Nepal is seeking a political route to a dispensation prioritising inclusive development.  
 
Ethnographic work undertaken with conflict-affected persons in the district of Bardiya in the mid-western plains of Nepal, is used 
to interrogate the relevance of legal empowerment to Nepal’s socially excluded.41 Bardiya is a district of agriculturalists and one 
of only two where the indigenous Tharu people are a majority.42 Their marginalisation has been heightened as a result of high 
caste migration to the traditionally forested areas where the Tharu live in the last decades of the twentieth century, and the loss 
of their land to those settlers who shared language and culture with the ruling elite.43 The result of this widespread loss of land 
accompanied by substantial debt was the creation of a class of bonded labourers among the Tharu, known as kamaiya: entire 
families constrained for generations to work for a landlord to pay off debts.44 
 
The Tharu were successfully mobilized by the Maoist movement, with the struggle over land and the People’s War entwined in 
Bardiya. During the war, some higher caste landlords were driven off their lands and these redistributed by the Maoists to the 
landless. Since the end of the conflict however fundamental dynamics in the district have not been challenged. Qualitative work 
with conflict affected families and communities indicates that their priorities are not law-centred, but economic: families seek 
guarantees of livelihood, which are perceived as linked to land ownership, and as a result an ability to ensure education and 
healthcare for their families. Having seen the law used largely as an instrument against their community since they first 
encountered the Nepali state, they have little faith that it can serve them. When asked about their priorities, only 7% of victims of 
state forces during the conflict mentioned prosecution of perpetrators.45 
 
Legal empowerment has been one of the planks of intervention of human rights agencies working since the end of the war with 
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conflict affected communities. The very legalistic understanding of this has however taken the form of external experts, largely 
from ethnic and caste elites, meeting with victim communities and submitting cases on their behalf, and advocating for the 
prosecution of violations committed during the war.46 There has however been no action from rights agencies around those 
issues most prioritised by the Tharu, notably social and economic rights. In particular, redistribution of assets – and most 
importantly that of land – remains entirely absent from rights discourse in Nepal, precisely because it is elite led.  
 
It is clear that the Tharu of Bardiya seek empowerment to play a role in the ‘new Nepal’ that political leaders (of all parties) have 
promised. However, the empowerment they seek is social, economic and ultimately, political. They quite rightly perceive the law, 
both locally in terms of land ownership, and nationally, in terms of challenging the impunity of the state, as operating in an 
entirely political space. Presuming that the empowerment of the marginalised should be around law, rather than the everyday 
politics with which the disempowered live, is precisely to reinforce the subordinate position they occupy in decision-making. The 
Tharu of Bardiya have seen very significant resources devoted to the funding of rights agencies who spend their funds on the 
collection of testimony and the effort to inculcate in victim communities an appreciation of the importance of legal process 
concerning the crimes of the conflict. The Tharu community, however, has seen no benefit to date of eight years of such advocacy, 
and are largely denied access to the products of such process – currently restricted to reports – by their illiteracy. The leader of 
Bardiya’s principal victim’s group, which is predominantly Tharu, has identified the legal focus of such agencies as the 
perpetuation of the authority of high caste, largely Kathmandu-based, elites, who seek to deny the social and economic agenda 
that drove the conflict and replace it with a narrow, legally-based one that does not challenge traditional inequalities.47 An 
extreme example of this legalism has been the efforts of a UN agency and an international NGO to offer legal advice to landlords 
displaced from Bardiya to help them regain their property, following Maoist seizure and redistribution of their land. This appears 
to local people as simply a political attempt on behalf of elites to return Nepal to a status quo that the conflict radically 
challenged. The danger of an empowerment strategy that is primarily legal is precisely that it uses a technical discourse largely 
unavailable to those most in need of it, resulting in the reinforcement of the power of ‘experts’, and elites who are comfortable in 
formal legal spaces. 
 
The structural violence to which the excluded are subject is rarely an object of legal sanction for a range of reasons. For example, 
the feudal relations between landlords and tenant farmers in Bardiya are the product of a power relationship that is historically, 
culturally and financially rooted. Even where the law is being broken, local enforcement will be by those sympathetic to the cause 
of the high caste landlord, or who can be corrupted to be so. In post-conflict spaces it is precisely the failure of governance that is 
both a cause and a symptom of conflict, and that serves to emphasise power imbalances. 
 
That women are also marginalised in Nepali societies was demonstrated by the interaction of patriarchy and victimisation in 
conflict. The wives of the disappeared are very often stigmatised by their in-laws and by their communities for no longer satisfying 
the narrow expectations of identity as daughter, wife or widow.48 Challenging the resulting social exclusion – which occurs largely 
in private domestic spaces – cannot be done through force of law, but requires empowerment within the community and is 
inextricably linked to ending women’s economic dependence on men. 
 
The unsurprising emphasis of the poor on addressing their poverty demands that one ask what role law can play in addressing 
chronic, structural violations of social and economic rights. The justiciability of such rights has long been discussed in theory, but 
in practice it has been a largely ineffective instrument.49 Additionally, poor states emerging from conflict are likely to be in no 
position to prioritise ensuring that populations’ fundamental economic rights are met, when the resources to enable this are 
absent. In Nepal the social and cultural rights that should ensure that discrimination against the indigenous does not occur are 
guaranteed in Nepali law but have simply never been enforced. In a rural district like Bardiya it is the lack of political power of 
indigenous groups, even where in the majority, that ensures that institutions such as bonded labour continue.  
 
The strategy that has been most successful for the Tharu, and that ultimately led to legal action against the kamaiya system, was 
a process of conscientisation. In the 1980s a Tharu-led NGO called BASE (Backward Society Education) was established with the 
key mission of educating the Tharu and challenging illiteracy.50 What this led to was the first political mobilisation of the Tharu, 
including strike action, around the kamaiya issue. This in turn led to legislation outlawing bonded labour: but it was the 
mobilisation that led the legal advocacy, suggesting that collective political action is more effective than a narrow campaign for 
changes in the law, and potentially a prerequisite for it.   
 
Access to justice in Nepal is highly constrained, both by geography in that police stations and courts are often far from rural 
populations, and by the fact that money is demanded by officials for almost any service provided.51 Post-conflict contexts such 
as Nepal are characterised by the poor quality of services provided by government: in the absence of adequate resources and 
given the quality of governance, access to justice will remain poor. As such, legal empowerment of excluded populations risks 
being met by a lack of governance capacity to respond to their demands. The informal justice sector is more accessible – Tharu 
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communities have an elder who mediates disputes. However, such figures have consistently been seen to uphold traditional 
patriarchal relationships within the community: these can be challenged, but through non-legal routes to empowerment. Such 
figures are anyway unable to impact upon non-Tharu hierarchies. 
 
The example of Nepal’s indigenous Tharu community is that addressing exclusion after conflict demands empowerment of the 
marginalised, but that the agenda goes beyond the legal. Indeed, the indication is that legal empowerment must be preceded by 
social, economic and political empowerment. This challenges a liberal understanding that individual rights are preeminent, when 
Nepal’s indigenous communities see themselves as collectivities, and have demonstrated that their collective political 
participation is most likely to deliver social and legal change that benefits them.  
 
 
Tunisia: social exclusion after revolution  
 
Tunisia is also a state with a long history of poor governance, poverty and inequality. Thus, in the immediate aftermath of the 
2011 Tunisian revolution expectations were raised that Tunisia’s marginalized populations, and impoverished regions in the 
South and West of the country, could strengthen their rights and meet their needs in post-transition Tunisia through legal 
empowerment. However, three years after the Tunisian revolution, one particular social group, Tunisia’s youth, failed to increase 
its power to participate in the decision-making process through law. Instead it was locked out of the post-authoritarian transition 
because of a politicized and elite-driven process. This elite driven process constitutes an important aspect of continuity with the 
past as external assistance aimed at empowering marginalized groups replicates pre-existing inequalities through an 
engagement with a small section of Tunisian civil society that is conversant with the international donor community and leaves 
broad sections of newly emergent groups excluded from taking advantage of new political openings provided by the 2011 
Tunisian revolution. 
 
The popular narrative of Tunisia’s 14 January 2011 revolution has the country’s youth at its core. Tunisia’s youth, having 
previously been seen as either marginalized or co-opted by the Ben Ali regime’s ruling party (the Rassemblement Constitutionnel 
Democratique (RCD)) were perceived in the aftermath of the Tunisian revolution to have played a crucial role in sending Ben Ali 
into exile.52 Indeed, the self-immolation of a 26 year-old fruit vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, set off a nationwide wave of protests 
that ultimately culminated in the overthrow of a deeply entrenched authoritarian regime that had presided over Tunisia since 
1987.53 However, underlying this popular narrative is a genealogy of contentious youth politics and demands for social justice 
that long predate Bouazizi’s self-immolation in 2010.54 To be sure, throughout the 2000s the Ben Ali regime sought to address 
Tunisia’s increasingly assertive youth population, which was confronted with the consequences of official graft and high 
unemployment. These structural challenges severely impacted Tunisia’s youth by erasing prospects for advancement, which were 
almost non-existent among marginalized socio-economic groups.55 
  
The Tunisian case study highlights that youth were disproportionately affected by socio-economic exclusion, which was the 
product of the Ben Ali regime’s notorious plunder of Tunisia’s economic resources.  Despite the RCD’s attempts to co-opt 
Tunisia’s youth, a growing awareness of corruption within a regime that controlled every sector of the economy from business and 
banking to agriculture fuelled youth discontentment with the ruling party. High profile acts of corruption, such as those 
highlighted in Wikileaks cables from the U.S. Embassy in Tunis released in 2010, served to further deepen public outrage with 
the Ben Ali regime. Thus, when Bouazizi set himself alight in a public display of defiance and desperation, the message of 
despair that this act communicated, resonated across Tunisia and was reproduced by youth activists who demanded the fall of 
the Ben Ali regime. 
 
It was therefore not surprising that initially, self-empowered demands for accountability for past corrupt practices were the main 
focus of transitional justice debates in the immediate aftermath of the 14 January revolution. For youth activists who demanded 
the departure of Ben Ali and his ruling party, stripping members of the ruling party of wealth acquired under the old regime in the 
name of social justice was a common refrain. Furthermore, in addition to demands for accountability for graft, youth political 
mobilization continues to emphasize key themes, such as access to employment, that were first articulated during the Ben Ali 
era.56 
  
Within months of the January 14th revolution, Tunisia’s interim authorities sought to address some of the grievances that had 
brought Tunisia’s youth on to the streets in December 2010 and January 2011. Tunisia’s interim Minister of Finance Jalloul Ayed 
announced a series of measures, known as Amal or hope, on April 1, 2011 aimed at reducing youth unemployment;57 however, 
Boubakri and Boujneh point out that despite the revolution having created a political space in with youth can openly criticize 
Tunisia’s post-revolutionary authorities, socio-economic inequalities remain a debilitating constraint on Tunisia’s transition.58  
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Another constraint, questioning Tunisian legal empowerment strategies, has been fostered by the international donor 
community. Despite a discourse that emphasizes strengthening local ownership of the transitional justice process, international 
assistance targeted elites, and in particular the Tunisian government, with workshops, conferences and trainings that were far 
removed, and largely inaccessible for those Tunisians from socially marginalized groups. As noted by one civil society informant 
during an interview in April 2014, international donors have worked with the Tunisia’s government’s preferred civil society 
partners rather than engage with groups than include marginalized voices from Tunisia’s impoverished regions.59 
  
An example of this was the Tunisian government’s attempt to empower youth by engaging them through the transitional justice 
process. Tunisia’s national consultation on transitional justice was launched with the participation of the International Center for 
Transitional Justice and the UNDP on April 14, 2012. However, despite the national consultation culminating in a transitional 
justice law that was ratified by the National Constituent Assembly in December 2013 youth participants felt disillusioned that 
many of their socio-economic concerns were not reflected in the transitional justice law. Rather, it focused for the most part on 
the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission. Overall, transitional justice in Tunisia, has been largely a top-down 
process in which Tunisia’s Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Justice played a central role in both coordinating 
transitional justice measures among Ministries, but also acting as a gatekeeper for civil society involvement in Tunisia’s official 
transitional justice processes. 
  
In addition to a top-down transitional justice process managed by the Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Justice, 
Tunisia’s post-revolutionary transitional authorities have left Tunisia’s youth outside transitional governing institutions. Instead of 
fulfilling the political promise and empowering youth to participate in the decision-making process through law, ruling elites have 
disenfranchised youth of their political involvement.  Despite an attempt by Tunisia’s major political parties to engage youth 
through youth political party organizations, Tunisia’s youth have largely found themselves excluded from leadership roles within 
Tunisian parties. Tunisia’s transition has been managed by elites, who are two generations removed from Tunisia’s youth, in part 
because of the political exclusion of an entire generation of political elites through political exclusion laws that barred former 
leading figures within the RCD from post-transition politics. The result of these exclusionary practices has been that rather than 
turning to Tunisia’s youth, Tunisian political parties have looked back toward those whose political activities preceded 1987, 
which has resulted in a generation of elderly politicians taking the lead in Tunisia’s transition. Illustrative of this is the fact that 
the leaders of Tunisia’s two largest political blocs, Beji Caid Essebsi and Rachid Ghannouchi, are 87 and 73 years of age 
respectively.  
 
In sum, the Tunisian case highlights that the international goal of empowering the local and underprivileged has resulted in a 
technocratic approach that has largely focused on providing assistance for institutions, and a narrow segment of elite civil 
society. It has largely failed to address those concerns, which brought Tunisia’s youth to the streets in 2010 and 2011. Despite 
the opportunity to integrate them into the transition, elites controlling the process avoided strengthening the political power of 
the revolution’s initial driving force. Although current political stakeholders could have guaranteed Tunisia’s youth constitutional 
participation rights, they preferred to exclude them from the decision-making process. The country’s transition has nonetheless 
proven exemplary among those states impacted by the Arab Spring, with political assassinations and political polarization failing 
to derail Tunisia’s constitution drafting process. Yet, in spite of the ratification of a new constitution in January 2014, Tunisia’s 
youth continue to take to the streets to voice demands for social justice that up until now remain to be addressed. 
 
 
Bosnia-Herzegovina: weak institutions, lack of accountability, and eroding legitimacy 
 
The violent disintegration of the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s affected Bosnia-Herzegovina especially hard. Over two decades 
after the outbreak of the conflict, the country is still facing daunting economic, political and social obstacles that impede the 
prospects for sustainable peace and development. Steep unemployment rates, particularly among the younger generation,60 and 
exclusionary politics burden the daily lives of Bosnians. While the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement put an end to the violent 
conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, its policy goals posed a myriad of problems for a long-term democratic transition process. One of 
the main issues was the incessant political tensions and confrontations at the different polity levels between the three principal 
ethnic groups consisting of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs.61 The fragile internationally-monitored Bosnian state structures and a 
number of closely related problems bear witness to the difficulties associated with implementing viable transition strategies. 
With limited success at the macro level, rights-based micro-level approaches, such as legal empowerment, are unlikely to 
contribute to a ground-breaking evolution of Bosnian socio-political conditions. Quite the contrary, in fact, as unstable 
government politics have recently provoked a crisis leading to the erosion of public support and a loss in legitimacy of political 
institutions and elites ruling the country. 
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A review of local initiatives, such as Vaša Prava, confirm the hypothesis of several legal empowerment advocates that 
strengthening the rights of marginalized populations requires political institutions with the capacity to implement reforms and to 
provide a number of services.62 While basic services exist for the most part across Bosnia-Herzegovina’s government institutions, 
the quality of the services often varies depending on the geographical location. In the case of Vaša Prava – a domestic non-profit 
organization created in 2003 that provides free legal services to disadvantaged populations such as refugees, returnees, and 
displaced people – conditions on the ground quickly revealed the limited impact of its activities. In spite of the initiative’s 
support to refugees helping them overcome administrative and legal hurdles upon their return home,63 Vaša Prava’s work fell 
short in addressing deeper structural issues within a highly divided society. A 2010 report evaluating its activities provides 
nonetheless a positive review of the non-profit organization’s involvement in the region.64 According to the author,  
 
Vaša Prava lawyers regularly invoked the European Convention on Human Rights in seeking judicial relief from unlawful actions. The organization 
also conducted numerous seminars and training sessions for government officials to educate them about their responsibilities … [and] broadened its 
reach by launching systemic advocacy campaigns. 65 
 
Under closer scrutiny, however, the report discloses the elite-driven strategy applied throughout the process, epitomized by high-
level training sessions of government officials.66 The projects seem less like a step toward empowering local populations than 
introducing global international human rights norms into an institutional environment that has not built the required capacity to 
absorb these demands – despite almost two decades of democratization and peace-building by the international community and 
the European Union. As a result, practices to integrate marginalized populations follow the traditional top-down approach that 
bear little resemblance with the ideological concept of legal empowerment that stresses the importance of strengthening local 
communities.  
 
Social exclusion is another conundrum that remains to be addressed during the country’s transition. It affects particularly 
minorities and disadvantaged populations, including Roma, refugees, and women. While rights-based approaches to improve 
the situation in a number of these cases have been implemented in recent years,67 many individuals require support that is 
needs-based instead of rights-based. For instance, several authors have underlined the importance of establishing domestic 
legislation in line with international law to provide domestic violence victims with legal tools to break the silence and prosecute 
their offenders.68 Before victims can deal with legal questions, however, more immediate needs have to be addressed, such as 
physical protection from their perpetrators. Several non-governmental organisations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, have 
played a pivotal role providing access to domestic violence shelters.69 Their work underlines that prioritizing individual needs 
instead of dealing with rights-based questions, can have a direct impact on individual safety and well-being. 
 
The tension between needs and rights has also been at stake when crafting adequate transitional justice strategies to deal with 
the past in the aftermath of the Balkan conflict. Interestingly, post-conflict justice across the region, despite a growing bottom-up 
discourse,70 has been characterized by a top-down – and repeatedly technocratic – approach to accountability for war crimes 
and to deal with the past. The rhetorical shift from the “rule of law” to “legal empowerment”, which now goes beyond criminal 
legal aid and also encompasses civil legal aid, is unlikely to change practices on the ground. A brief review of past post-conflict 
justice efforts in the Balkans exposes the inherent problems that a rights-based approach with the goal of serving disadvantaged 
populations entails. While the United Nations Security Council evoked the principle of the rule of law during the conflict in the 
Balkans to promote peace and stability by creating the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY),71 today’s legacy of 
the tribunal remains controversial.72 The long-hoped for legal spillover effect of international humanitarian law into domestic 
courtrooms has faced a number of difficulties. Moreover, legal aid to witnesses and victims in trial procedures was riddled with 
problems.73 Due to the shortcomings of retributive justice, grassroots organizations launched an initiative to establish a regional 
truth commission called RECOM Coalition in 2005.74 In the beginning, the initiative was successful and promising, because it 
advocated a victim-centred approach. As the movement gained momentum, however, the objectives and the strategy within the 
leadership of the RECOM Coalition shifted, promoting an elitist perspective that overlooked the needs of local populations.75 
Similar to the initially bottom-up restorative justice processes in the former Yugoslavia, current legal empowerment strategies 
operate within an elite-driven environment, that risks alienating the underprivileged target group. The lack of stable and 
transparent government institutions only exacerbates the conditions for success on the ground. 
 
As mentioned earlier, legal empowerment requires an institutional system that people can trust. The public trust in the Bosnian 
political structure, however, has slowly eroded over the years. The recent social uprisings in many towns and cities across the 
country alarmingly stress that society has lost confidence in political elites, who, according to the CLEP report, would be 
necessary to introduce wide-ranging reforms to improve individual rights at the local level. The first widespread protests since the 
end of the war in 1995 occurred in spring 2013, when citizens in Sarajevo formed a human chain around the parliament to force 
policymakers to pass a law that would guarantee the issuance of identification cards after an old law had lapsed, leaving many 
new-borns without identification.76 While last year’s protests were peaceful, the riots that broke out in Tuzla in February 2014, 
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escalated in violence and have reached other towns such as Sarajevo, Brčko and Mostar, among others.77 The public anger was 
sparked by workers who were laid off in Tuzla after a factory closed down due to the prolonged economic crisis and the inability of 
the national government to spur economic growth and prosperity in the region. The intensity of the protests is a sign of acute 
disapproval of government policies.78 The current political mayhem in Bosnia-Herzegovina exposes the eroding legitimacy of the 
national government and the political system that was put in place by the Dayton Peace Agreement. Given the required 
institutional structure necessary to successfully implement a narrowly focused rights-based approaches to empower local 
communities, the likelihood to close the deep socio-political cleavages within Bosnian society is slim. As with the case of Nepal 
and Tunisia, priority should not be given to legal reform at the local level, but instead, current developments point to the need for 
structural change that can only come from within society and will help put an end to corruption, mismanagement and political 
gridlock. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The cases of Nepal, Tunisia and Bosnia-Herzegovina have underlined the difficulties resulting from applying legal empowerment 
strategies in post-conflict contexts. The set of issues generally associated with the use of legal instruments to aid empowerment 
of local populations in these settings include on the one hand the problem of adequately addressing the need of the affected and 
marginalized; and on the other hand, the conundrum of fragile institutions in these areas and poor governance. While 
mobilisation of remote Nepalese communities could foster more promising change than narrow legal reforms, collective action in 
Tunisia did not fuel the much hoped for social change and participation in the political process for marginalised youth. Moreover, 
the example of Bosnia-Herzegovina illustrates the perverse effects of top-down generated reform processes that lead to a lack of 
trust and ultimately a loss of legitimacy in the institutions and their leadership.  The increasing distrust, however, cannot simply 
be solved by introducing yet another layer of legal instruments to cope with the intricate social and economic problems that 
emerge after conflict or regime change. Although this article discussed only three cases, these can serve as a catalyst for further 
analysis with additional in-depth comparative work to map promising strategies for marginalized populations in post-conflict 
settings. It is also an incentive to look beyond the widely hailed liberal approach in recent years and emphasise the need for 
social and economic change at the structural level.  
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